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Abstract: Knowledge of the condition being tested for is increasingly acknowledged 
as an important factor in prenatal testing and screening decisions. An analysis of the 
way in which family members living with an inheritable condition use and value this 
knowledge has much to add to debates around whether and how this type of 
knowledge could be made available to prospective parents facing screening decisions. 
This paper reports on in-depth interviews with sixty-one people (conducted 2007-9), 
with a genetic condition in their family, Spinal Muscular Atrophy (SMA). Many 
participants described their intimate familial knowledge of SMA as offering them 
valuable insights with which they could imagine future lives. Other participants, 
however, found themselves trapped between their experiential knowledge of SMA 
and their (often) competing responsibility to maintain the wellbeing of their family. 
Still others established a ‘hierarchy’ of knowledge to rank the authenticity of different 
family member’s accounts of SMA in order to discredit, or justify, their decisions. 
This paper highlights the way in which experiential knowledge of the condition being 
tested for cannot be unproblematically assumed to be a useful resource in the context 
of prenatal testing and screening decisions, and may actually constrain reproductive 
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Introduction 
 ‘Experiential knowledge’ is a term that has been used by various researchers to 
account for the ‘experiential and particularistic’ (Abel and Browner, 1998: 310) ways 
of knowing the world that individuals draw upon to assess risks, evaluate expert 
knowledge and make decisions, particularly in relation to health. In the context of 
reproductive decision making, experience of the disability or condition being tested 
for is increasingly recognised as an important source of knowledge that prospective 
parents draw upon to evaluate reproductive risks and make informed decisions 
(Etchegary et al., 2008; France et al., 2011). For disability rights supporters, this form 
of knowledge has political significance in a social context that largely devalues the 
lives of disabled people and offers predominantly medical model interpretations of 
life with disability in prenatal testing contexts (Shakespeare, 1999; Williams et al., 
2002; Parens and Asch, 2000). As prenatal screening and testing practices expand, 
increasing the number and nature of decisions to be made by would-be parents, the 
need to understand the role that experiential knowledge plays in informing such 
decisions appears set to become ever more important. The recent moves towards the 
introduction of genetic screening for a host of recessive conditions (Human Genetics 
Commission, 2011), together with the introduction of newborn screening 
programmes, mean that in the future more parents will be making screening and 
testing decisions for conditions of which they have no prior experience or knowledge. 
Therefore, understanding the role and status of experiential knowledge of disability in 
the context of prenatal testing and screening, and its usefulness to prospective parents, 
is now critical. 
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 ‘Experiential knowledge’ is a term that has been used differently by different 
researchers. Whilst for some, experiential knowledge is a term synonymous with ‘lay 
knowledge’ (Caron-Fintermann et al., 2005) - a concept already well-researched 
within medical sociology (Wynne, 1996; Popay and Williams, 1996) - for others, it 
has specific defining characteristics. Borkman (1976), for example, outlines two key 
features of experiential knowledge: 1) it is knowledge based upon the experiences of 
an individual and 2) it is knowledge that is highly valued by that individual as it has 
been acquired through the individual’s direct interaction with the physical, social and 
intellectual world (Borkman, 1979: 450). For Borkman (1979), experiential 
knowledge has pragmatic uses; it is translated into strategies and methods for living 
with a particular problem, which is then pooled with others, typically in the context of 
a self-help organisation. More recently, however, there has been a move away from a 
definition of experiential knowledge as a template for action, and instead an emphasis 
on its contextual, subjective, unconscious and emotional properties. Abel and 
Browner (1998) differentiate two distinct types of experiential knowledge: 
‘embodied’ and ‘empathetic’. Embodied knowledge refers to personal perceptions of 
bodily experiences and sensations (e.g. pregnancy), whereas empathetic knowledge is 
derived from close association with others living with a particular experience (e.g. 
care giving). Thus, ‘one derives from direct sensory experience, the other from close 
emotional ties between individuals’ (Abel and Browner, 1998: 315). These definitions 
have been taken up by different researchers to explore how proximity to the 
experience in question creates different ways of knowing (e.g. D’Agincourt-Canning, 
2003; Etchegary et al., 2008). 
Whilst researchers have suggested various ways in which experiential 
knowledge can be defined, acquired and used, there nevertheless appears to be 
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agreement in the literature that it is a key form of knowledge that is drawn upon in the 
context of decision making and risk assessment. Indeed, the role of experiential 
knowledge in informing genetic risk perceptions and genetic testing decisions has 
been analysed for conditions as diverse as Cancer (Hallowell, 2006; D’Agincourt-
Canning, 2005), Huntingdon’s Disease (Downing, 2005; Cox, 2003), X- linked 
conditions (Parsons and Atkinson, 1992; Kay and Kingston, 2002) and Cystic Fibrosis 
(Wertz et al, 1992; Evers-Kiebooms et al., 1988). More recently, however, its role in 
prenatal testing and screening decisions has been emphasised (Etchegary et al., 2008; 
France et al., 2011).   
For disability rights supporters, experiential knowledge of the tested-for 
condition is regarded as having political significance. Such writers have argued that 
screening and testing decisions take place in a societal context in which disability is 
valued primarily in negative ways, and yet disabled people’s everyday experiential 
knowledge of life with their particular disability is often at odds with this valuation 
(Parens and Asch, 2000; Shakespeare, 1999). Williams et al. (2002) for example, have 
argued that there has been a tendency within the medical profession, when offering 
advice to would-be parents facing screening and testing decisions, to focus on the 
medical complications associated with particular disabilities, rather than the (often) 
positive experiences of those currently living with the condition. Consequently, there 
have been calls for more ‘balanced’ information to be made available to would-be 
parents about the reality of life with disability (Shakespeare, 1999), and a cross-
referencing of the literature around prenatal testing and experiences of disability 
within families (Kelly, 2009). For some writers, this extension of ‘balanced 
information’ has included a recommendation that prospective parents access 
experiential accounts of disability and impairment, whether through contact with 
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disabled people living with the condition to be tested for (Fletcher, 2002), or through 
web-based resources (Ahmed et al., 2007). 
Whilst the political value and relevance of experiential knowledge is 
established in the disability rights literature, however, very little is known about the 
way in which it is used and represented in actual prenatal testing and screening 
decisions. There is some evidence to suggest that this knowledge informs screening 
and testing decisions (in various ways) both in the literature (Etchegary et al., 2008; 
Bryant et al., 2005; Chaplin et al., 2005; Gow, 2000; Chen and Shiffman, 2000) and 
anecdotally (Atkinson, 2008; Bowler, 2006; Lancaster, 2011), however there have 
been relatively few analyses focusing specifically on this form of knowledge. Two 
recent studies have explored the role of experiential knowledge of the condition being 
tested for in reproductive decisions (France et al., 2011; Etchegary et al., 2008), 
however the participants in these studies did not have a familial history of the 
condition (with the exception of four participants in France et al.’s (2011) study), and 
thus much of the experiential knowledge reported was of a more distant ‘empathetic’ 
nature and did not include an analysis of the influence of more intimate, or 
‘embodied’ experiential knowledge (Abel and Browner, 1998).  
 This paper will address this gap in the literature, by highlighting the way in 
which experiential knowledge of an inheritable condition, Spinal Muscular Atrophy, 
is negotiated in reproductive decision making within families, including family 
members of varying levels of proximity to the experience of the condition, and thus 
with contrasting ways of ‘knowing’ SMA. The familial context of this analysis brings 
into sharp focus many of the key issues around the uses of experiential knowledge, 
including what counts as experiential knowledge (both embodied and empathetic), 
who is entitled to lay claim to it and how it is of use in the context of reproduction. In 
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order to consider these issues, an analysis of sixty-one qualitative interviews with 
families living with Spinal Muscular Atrophy will be presented and discussed. Firstly, 
the accounts of those whose experiential knowledge was mobilised to reinforce and 
confirm their reproductive decisions will be presented. Secondly, some of the ways 
that families found experiential knowledge to be a restrictive, rather than assistive, 
resource will be discussed. 
  
Spinal Muscular Atrophy 
After Cystic Fibrosis, SMA is the most common (potentially fatal) autosomal 
recessively inherited condition in the UK,  meaning it is a single gene disorder 
requiring both parents to carry one copy of the deleted SMN1 gene (believed to cause 
SMA) to transmit SMA to future generations. SMA affects approximately one in 
every six thousand newborns in the North West European population (Dreesen et al., 
1998). It is a neuromuscular condition characterised by degeneration of the anterior 
horn cells of the spinal cord leading to generalised, and often severe, muscle 
weakness. SMA has been sub-categorised into three distinct clinical ‘types’ (I-III) 
with different presentations, ages of onset, severity of muscle weakness and prognosis 
(ranging from early infantile death in the case of type I to late onset muscle weakness 
in adulthood in type III). However, in spite of these categorisations, the boundaries of 
the types of SMA are widely contested within the medical community and there 
indeed appears to be vast overlap in symptoms between them (Dubowitz, 1991, 
2008). For example, infants with a clinical diagnosis of SMA type I have been known 
to survive well into childhood, and some children diagnosed as having type II SMA 
(an intermediate form of SMA, usually associated with an inability to walk from early 
childhood) go on to become ambulant for many years (Dubowitz, 1991, 2008). Whilst 
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the classifications of SMA, therefore, may give a guide to clinicians and families as to 
the likely trajectory of the disease, there remains a large degree of uncertainty as to 
how SMA will be experienced by an individual and the severity of the muscle 
weakness. 
 
Spinal Muscular Atrophy and Reproductive Genetics 
In order to understand the reproductive dilemmas faced by families living with SMA, 
it is necessary to understand the way in which SMA is inherited. It is estimated that 
one in forty people in the general population are ‘carriers’ of the deleted SMN1 gene 
thought to cause SMA, i.e. they can transmit the condition but have no symptoms 
themselves (Wirth, 2000). When such parents reproduce, they have a: 
- 25% chance of having a child who will be affected by SMA. 
- 50% chance of having a child who will be an asymptomatic carrier of SMA. 
- 25% chance of having a child that will be neither a carrier nor affected by 
SMA. 
As population screening for SMA is not yet offered (although there are calls to 
introduce it (Prior, 2008; Su et al., 2011)) people usually learn they are carriers for 
SMA when their child or relative is diagnosed. Both prenatal testing and Pre-
Implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) are licensed for use in the UK for SMA, and 
relatives of a person diagnosed with SMA can also undergo carrier testing of 
themselves and their partners to assess their risks of transmitting the condition to 
offspring.  
Whilst prenatal testing is available for SMA, however, the test cannot 
accurately predict the severity of SMA to be expected. The severity of SMA in 
existing relatives is often cited by geneticists and genetic counsellors as a rough 
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guide, although there are many cases of different ‘types’ being diagnosed within one 
family (Dubowitz, 1991). The wide spectrum of severities associated with SMA, 
therefore, and the inability of prenatal tests to discern them, adds complexity to the 
reproductive dilemmas faced by prospective parents with SMA in their family (Opera 




Interviews were conducted between 2007 and 2009 with sixty-one participants who 
all had at least one person diagnosed with SMA in their family (see Table 1 for the 
types of SMA diagnosed within the sample). Family members with differing levels of 
proximity to the diagnosed person (e.g. parent, sibling, grandparent) were included to 
allow an analysis of different forms of experiential knowledge (see Table 2). The 
interviews were designed to elicit participants’ stories of life with SMA before 
moving on to a discussion of views around, and uses of, reproductive technologies. 
The practical and ethical implications of completing this research are discussed 
elsewhere (Brown and Boardman, 2011). 
Participants were recruited into the study through the main advocacy group for 
people living with SMA in the UK, the Jennifer Trust for Spinal Muscular Atrophy 
(JTSMA). The JTSMA currently supports around two thousand families living with 
SMA in the UK (JTSMA, 2011). Recruitment occurred through a variety of channels-
through the JTSMA annual conference (n=16), through advertisements placed in 
JTSMA publications (n=16), personal contacts (n=3) and snowball sampling (n=22). 
Snowball sampling allowed for the inclusion of several members of the same family 
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which facilitated a direct comparison of different levels of experiential knowledge, 
which strengthened the analysis.  
In order to allow for the possibility that people living with SMA might not 
identify with their diagnosis or with the values of the JTSMA, as well as to 
circumvent some of the class and gender biases associated with support groups 
(Stockdale and Terry, 2002) recruitment was also attempted outside the JTSMA, 
through disability organisations (Motability and DaDa) as well as personal websites 
set up and run by families living with SMA, however, these methods only led to the 
successful recruitment of four participants.  
As the participants were geographically dispersed within the UK, interviewing 
also took place through a variety of channels: forty-four were carried out over the 
telephone, ten via email and five were face-to-face (four interviews were joint 
interviews and one participant was interviewed twice). Telephone and face-to-face 
interviews lasted on average for one hour and ten minutes, and the email interviews 
took place over periods lasting from three weeks to eight months. Email interviewing 
is a method of interviewing whereby interview questions and answers are exchanged 
electronically via email (Burns, 2010). This method of interviewing allowed 
participants to answer in instalments, at times and dates of their convenience (McCord 
and Schwaber Kerson, 2006), which facilitated participation due to the (potentially) 
emotionally demanding nature of the topic and because the majority of participants 
were caring for young children/managing complex disabilities. Moreover, five of the 
ten participants who opted for this type of interview stated that it was in order to have 
time to carefully consider their responses. The method of interviewing employed was 
determined primarily by participant preference, but also took into account their 
geographical location, as well as the constraints of the research budget. The ethical 
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considerations associated with using these different interview techniques (particularly 
in the context of being a researcher with a visible disability), as well as the 
implications they had for the data produced, are discussed elsewhere (Brown and 
Boardman, 2011). All of the data presented in this paper are derived from telephone 
interviews.  
The interviews were transcribed verbatim (with names and identifiers removed 
or changed), and the text responses from the email interviews were compiled into 
single documents for analysis. A constructivist approach to grounded theory data 
analysis was used- an approach that allows for an understanding that data is co-
produced by both researchers and participants, and constructed through the 
interpretive lens of both the researcher and the researched. This approach was 
considered appropriate for an interpretive study of participants’ perceptions of life 
with SMA as well as their genetic risk. Initially, ‘open coding’ (Gibbs, 2007) of the 
data was undertaken which was largely descriptive, before hierarchical coding was 
undertaken through the use of qualitative data analysis software, Nvivo 7. A process 
of coding, refinement of concepts (through data interpretation), followed by re-coding 
and further sampling were carried out over a period of eight months until ‘theoretical 
saturation’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) had occurred.   
 
Findings 
Experiential Knowledge as Assistive Resource  
For families, experiences of living with SMA were often described as an important 
way through which future lives with SMA could be imagined, and reproductive 
decisions arrived at. Living intimately with SMA, and often also having close 
involvement in the lives of other families living with SMA, meant that some 
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participants in the study felt quite confident in their ability to predict not only what 
life would be like for a future child affected by SMA, but also their ability to manage 
it as a parent to that potential child. 
Matthew is in his twenties and is the able bodied sibling of Cara, who was 
diagnosed with type II SMA in childhood. Matthew reported that his experiences of 
growing up alongside a sister with SMA, but also working with disabled people, 
shaped his perception of the concept of having a child with a disability more 
generally: 
I think sort of having the family history I have, living with my sister 
for twenty-five years, makes me far less inclined to be worried about 
having a disabled child myself, whether it be SMA or Down’s 
Syndrome or whatever because [pause] because I don’t see…you 
know I went on to take a job with disabled people, I work with 
students who have Down’s Syndrome and similar conditions, which 
I probably took on because I have that insight and I….I certainly see 
that it doesn’t make them of any less worth….When you’re close to 
disability, you start to see it as simply a different way of doing 
things, rather than a problem. It’s just an example of difference 
within individuals […] so no, I’ve never been interested in knowing 
what my carrier status [for SMA] is because it won’t make a 
difference to me. I’d value any child the same.  
Despite the fact that Press et al.’s (1998) and Etchegary et al.’s (2008) respective 
studies suggest that women’s personal experiences of disability, whether within their 
own families or broader social circles, do not necessarily lead to more accepting 
attitudes about the possibility of having a disabled child themselves, for Matthew (as 
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for a further five of the seven able bodied siblings of people with SMA), living 
alongside SMA allayed any fears about having a disabled child himself. As Matthew 
reported, feelings about having a child with SMA were correlated with his feelings 
about disability more generally.  
 As well as those participants who stated that their experiential knowledge 
reassured them as to the potential quality of life of future lives affected by SMA, for 
other participants, their experiential knowledge of life with SMA left them equally 
certain in their perspective, but steered them towards entirely different reproductive 
decisions. For parents of children who experienced severe SMA and died in infancy, 
or those who experienced ongoing illnesses, the suffering associated with SMA was 
presented as an unquestionable fact.  
Fraser is in his fifties and experienced the gradual deterioration and eventual deaths of 
his first two children as a result of type I SMA at ten and eight months of age 
respectively. He and his wife Charlie went on to have two able bodied children after 
prenatal testing for SMA was introduced in 1995, having terminated their first 
pregnancy after their children’s deaths due to a positive prenatal test for SMA. The 
finding that parents of children with Type I SMA, like Fraser and Charlie, were more 
likely to go on to have further children than those of children with Type II or III 
reflects earlier studies of the reproductive decisions of couples following the birth of a 
child with a genetic condition. Indeed, D’Amico et al. (1992) found that those parents 
whose child died in infancy were far more likely to attempt further pregnancies than 
those parents whose affected child survived. Fraser’s account of his reproductive 
decision making was less fraught with the uncertainties and dilemmas reported by 
other participants as the suffering his first two children went through left no room for 
interpretation and made him feel secure in the meaning he attributed to his 
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experiential knowledge-that it was a warning as to the poor quality of life associated 
with SMA: 
…the ability to undergo prenatal testing was a Godsend to us 
because no one would want that if they could avoid it and I think 
everybody would say the same who is affected by it. I don’t see 
any dilemma at all with type I testing, the test is there and every 
parent should take advantage of that […] I know some people talk 
about type Is living past their first birthday, but that wasn’t going 
to be the case for our children, so I think I’m sitting in the securest 
spot in the whole argument. No one could argue with my 
decision…because of the outcome with type Is.  
The broadly different presentations associated with SMA and inability of the prenatal 
tests to distinguish between them means that there remains a large degree of 
uncertainty surrounding prenatal testing for SMA. For Fraser, however, like the 
parents in Roberts and Franklin’s (2004) study, the suffering and shortened life 
expectancy that would be experienced by his future children was presented as a 
certainty; Fraser reported that he knew that survival wasn’t going to possible for any 
of his children with Type I. By representing his reproductive decisions in this way, 
Fraser was able to more easily conceptualise where his reproductive responsibilities 
lay: to prevent the suffering associated with SMA in future generations through the 
use of genetic technologies. 
Whilst Matthew and Fraser were therefore quite clear in the way in which they 
interpreted and used their experiential knowledge in the representation of their 
reproductive decisions (even though these decisions were very different from each 
other), for other participants, rather than clarifying and strengthening their position, 
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experiential knowledge of the condition being tested for could introduce new levels of 
complexity to reproductive decision making.  
 
The Limitations of Experiential Knowledge 
Whilst experiential knowledge of SMA was treated by some participants as a taken-
for-granted product of their experiences of the world, for others, it was described as a 
privileged form of insight available only to a minority of individuals. Participants in 
this study came to know SMA from a variety of different perspectives: as the parents, 
carers, spouses, siblings, partners, or children of individuals with SMA, or people 
diagnosed with SMA themselves. The question as to which of these individuals had 
access to the appropriate experiences, identities and subjectivities to give them a 
validated standpoint from which to lay claim to ‘knowing’ SMA (and thus able to 
predict its likely future impact), however, was contested within the families 
themselves. Indeed, despite the ‘empathetic’, as well as ‘embodied’ (through emotion 
and care work) (Abel and Browner, 1998) experiential knowledge of SMA possessed 
by the siblings of people diagnosed with SMA, such as Matthew, the accounts of 
some people diagnosed with SMA themselves suggested different criteria by which a 
person can ‘know’ SMA.  
For many participants diagnosed with SMA, their family members’ knowledge 
of what it’s like to live with the condition was always partial and incomplete. Gill is 
in her fifties and was diagnosed with SMA type II in childhood. Whilst Gill’s able-
bodied brother, Luke (also interviewed), reported having acquired a positive attitude 
to having a disabled child himself through his (largely) positive experiences of 
growing up alongside, and witnessing, his sister’s disability, Gill disqualified her 
brother’s knowledge claims when she talked about her life with SMA: 
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I definitely feel that no one can ever know what SMA is really like 
until they live with it themselves, you know, they’ve got it. Because 
other people, outsiders, no matter how close they are to you, they 
could be in your family even, they can’t put themselves in your 
position. And my brother, he doesn’t really know how much help I 
need, because while I was at home with him growing up I was quite 
capable of doing quite a bit for myself, it’s only since I’ve moved 
out and lived on my own that now I need PAs [personal assistants] 
all the time…He [Luke] knows I need help, but I don’t think he 
knows how much help I need. So it’s really just between me and my 
PAs [personal assistants]. Not even my friends...it’s not something 
you...talk about..[…]…nobody sees that apart from the person who’s 
helping me. And even then, how do they know how it feels to you? 
So yes …you can’t know unless you’ve lived that life. 
Whilst Abel and Browner (1998) distinguished between ‘embodied’ and ‘empathic’ 
knowledge in the way in which people gain experiential knowledge, for Gill, 
experiential knowledge was a bounded form of knowledge; it could only be accessed 
by those living with the condition themselves, and was not transferrable to ‘outsiders’ 
by virtue of them living with her. There is a strong contrast between Luke, Gill’s 
brother, who described his experiences with SMA as ‘first-hand’, and Gill who 
referred to all people as ‘outsiders’- outside of her body, perspective and standpoint 
and thus ineligible to evaluate her life. Indeed, as her care needs changed over time, 
and she moved out of the parental home, her experiences of SMA began to change; 
she took on personal assistants and experienced independent living, and thus her 
brother’s knowledge of what life with SMA was like became outdated, pointing to the 
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way in which experiential knowledge, even for the person diagnosed with SMA, can 
only ever be incomplete and partial, contained by past and present circumstances, and 
constantly subject to revision and change .  
For Gill, being able to discredit Luke’s perception of her life with SMA was 
particularly important in relation to her interpretation of his eventual decision to 
undergo carrier testing prior to him having his two children (in spite of his reported 
indifference to having a child with SMA). Indeed, for people diagnosed with SMA 
themselves, being able to claim authoritative knowledge of SMA could serve as a 
bastion against the emotional harm associated with the thought that Luke might wish 
to prevent a life affected by SMA. As Gill commented when recalling her brother’s 
decision to undergo carrier testing: 
I actually gave Luke all the information [about the genetics of 
SMA] before he and his wife started trying for a baby, so they 
could know about their options and choices and I was glad they 
had it, but once I’d given the information, I realised that 
information is really powerful and that then they had a choice 
and I started to think, if I had known that she [Luke’s wife]was 
pregnant and she had a little baby with SMA, and they got rid of 
it, I mean that would have been shattering. Because that tells you 
a lot about what they think about my life. And actually my life, 
from where I’m seeing it, is probably a hell of a lot better than 
most people’s…but they can’t see it from where I’m seeing it, 
only from where they are, which is probably quite different, so 
their decision wouldn’t really be based on reality, if you know 
what I mean.   
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Being able to police the boundaries of who could claim experiential knowledge was 
crucial, not just for individuals with SMA considering the reproductive decisions of 
others, but also prospective parents (with and without SMA), as it enabled 
participants to discredit the perspectives of others who may criticise their decisions or 
viewpoints (by labelling them as ‘ignorant’ or not suitably qualified to comment on 
life with SMA) or protect against the emotional harm inflicted by the reproductive 
decisions of others (Boardman, 2011).  
This risk of emotional harm to family members was indeed a key concern of 
many participants living intimately with SMA- it complicated their reproductive 
decisions and closed down particular ways of justifying and presenting them. Claire 
(aged thirty-two) is the able bodied sibling of Leah, now in her twenties, who was 
diagnosed with type II SMA in childhood. Claire has a long term partner and was 
considering having children at the time of interview. However, Claire’s family 
experience with SMA left her in what she felt was an impossible dilemma: 
Yeah I think I’m in quite a difficult position really because of 
what I know. Because my first thought was that I would never 
bother with any sort of testing [for SMA] if we were going down 
that route [having children] because I know SMA quite well 
really and I see what a wonderful person Leah is, and you know 
we often say that her condition has given her strength, mental 
strength, that she may never have developed otherwise…but I 
also know the other layers of it. I suppose it sounds sort of cold 
to say it, but it’s human nature to sort of think ‘if that could be 
preventable for somebody…Is it going to be really difficult or is 
it something that you can take on?’ Of course you’re going to 
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want the child that doesn’t struggle with things….so on the one 
hand I’ve got that, but on the other hand I’ve got ‘what would 
that say to Leah?’ It would be like me saying that she wasn’t 
important or that her life wasn’t worthwhile with her condition. 
So where do you go with that? Um yeah I’m stuck between a 
rock and a hard place! 
Claire’s dilemma tallies with the reproductive dilemmas of parents of children with 
genetic conditions reported in Kelly’s (2009) study. For such parents, removing 
themselves from the ‘technologically imposed’ reproductive decisions (Kelly, 2009: 
84) was a strategy used to circumvent the dilemmas around becoming pregnant 
described by Claire, and also echoed in the accounts of many other parents and 
siblings of children with type II SMA. Unlike the parents of children type I SMA, 
who often presented their reproductive decisions in terms of the need to prevent 
‘certain’ suffering with SMA, families living with type II had to negotiate their 
reproductive decisions around their experiential knowledge of life with a condition 
around which a successful and fulfilling life could be built. This tension between 
wishing to prevent disability in future offspring and yet also acknowledging the value 
and worth of a person’s life with that particular condition is reflected in what Larson 
(1998) refers to as the ‘paradox’ of disability. Through her interviews with Mexican 
mothers of children with disabilities, Larson (1998) outlined the friction that existed 
in the mothers’ lives- between their feelings of love for their disabled child, but their 
simultaneous desire to eradicate the disability and problems associated with it 
(Larson, 1998: 865). Indeed, this difficulty with separating out the child (or potential 
child) from the disability is at the heart of much of the disability rights response to 
prenatal testing and selective termination (Asch, 1999; Edwards, 2004). Whilst, as 
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Edwards (2004) has argued, the ‘expressivist objection’, or the notion that prenatal 
testing and selective termination expresses a negative valuation of people living with 
the condition being tested for, rests on a false notion that disability is wholly identity-
constituting, what is clear that it is nevertheless an important influence on the way in 
which families affected by genetic conditions approach reproductive decision making. 
For Claire, a decision to prevent the birth of a child with SMA could not be justified 
or substantiated through the notion of protecting the ‘best interests’ of the future 
child, indeed, her experiential knowledge of her sister’s life suggested that a diagnosis 
of SMA was not incompatible with a good quality of life; thus Claire became trapped 
between her experiential knowledge and her own fears about what her own child’s 




Through interviews with families and individuals affected by SMA, experiential 
knowledge of the condition being tested for emerged as a key mediator in the decision 
making processes around the use of genetic technologies and selective termination, as 
has been demonstrated elsewhere in relation to families living with other genetic 
conditions (Kay and Kingston, 2002; Kelly, 2009; Beeson and Globus, 1985), and in 
decision making surrounding antenatal screening (France et al., 2011; Etchegary et 
al., 2008). Participants in this study approached reproductive decision making in the 
context of having lived with someone with SMA or having SMA themselves, through 
which they assessed their genetic risk, formulated their reproductive decisions and 
accounted for these decisions. For many participants, presenting SMA as a disability 
that could be ‘overcome’ and around which a happy and fulfilling life could be 
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established, was justified by reference to intimate experiential knowledge of SMA. 
For these participants, experiencing SMA in their family was described as an 
important influence on attitudes to disability more generally; allowing them to see 
disability in a positive way having witnessed their family cope successfully with 
SMA. For disability rights supporters, such experiential knowledge of disability is 
crucial in balancing out the medicalised portrayals of the conditions which are often 
presented in the context of antenatal screening consultations (Fletcher, 2002; Asch, 
2000). 
It is noteworthy, however, that experiential knowledge of SMA was also 
strategically mobilised in a similar way by participants who took measures to prevent 
the lives of future people with SMA. By drawing on the suffering of previous or 
existing family members with SMA, participants were able to justify their decisions to 
take active steps prevent further lives affected by the condition. Consequently, this 
analysis highlights that the way in which experiential knowledge is used in 
reproductive decision making reveals more about the way that it is valued than what is 
actually decided; similar strategies of prioritising and valuing experiential knowledge 
of SMA (as an indicator of future suffering), were used both by those who wished to 
prevent, but also those who felt comfortable with, the possibility of SMA in their 
offspring. 
This research, however, also outlines the possibilities for contestation around 
ownership of such experiential knowledge within family relationships, particularly 
around family members’ right to claim ‘embodied’ or ‘empathetic’ experiential 
knowledge, as well as the status of these respective forms of knowledge (Abel and 
Browner, 1998). Whilst previous research has highlighted the way in which 
experiential knowledge may be defined according to its proximity to the experience in 
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question (Etchegary et al., 2008), previous analyses have overlooked the way the 
concepts of closeness and distance become ordered hierarchically in accounts of 
reproductive decision making. This study has demonstrated that participants 
developed a ‘hierarchy of experiential knowledge’ as an important means by which to 
check the authenticity of each other’s accounts of life with SMA and to discredit (or 
justify) particular standpoints (Boardman, 2010). Those closest to the experience of 
SMA- those diagnosed with it- often laid claim to being at the top of this hierarchy of 
knowledge, achieved through their embodied experiential knowledge of SMA, over 
and above those family members who came to know SMA empathetically, through 
the experiences of their relative. D’Agincourt-Canning (2003)’s study of familial 
experiences of cancer, however, suggests that ‘empathetic’ and ‘embodied’ forms of 
knowledge can in fact become heavily intertwined in daily life; care work, for 
example, is a thoroughly embodied activity (D’Agincourt-Canning, 2003: 151), and 
family members living alongside SMA indeed described the physical and emotional 
impact of the condition in terms of their own embodied experiences.  Whilst it may 
not be possible, therefore, to distinguish which accounts of SMA are more ‘real’ or 
offer ‘better’ insight into life with SMA, there was, nevertheless, certainly evidence 
that the hierarchical organisation of different ways of knowing SMA was an important 
strategy used in the justification of certain standpoints and decisions about 
reproduction, as well as the discrediting of others. Being able to claim ‘closeness’ to 
SMA and thus the ability to assign oneself the status of the ‘knower’, was an 
important way for the participants in this study to establish authority on ‘their’ 
condition and bolster the legitimacy, and validity, of their views and decisions around 
reproduction. The existence of such a hierarchy within participants’ responses 
highlights some of the potential difficulties associated with imparting experiential 
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knowledge to the general public in the context of genetic screening programmes and 
the potential for contestation around its ownership and transferability between 
individuals.   
By highlighting the various ways in which experiential knowledge is used and 
presented by families living with SMA approaching reproduction, this research has 
implications for professional counselling of families living with genetic disease. In 
particular, the findings suggest that it may be useful for genetic counsellors to explore 
experiential knowledge when counselling families affected by inheritable conditions, 
including the experiences and attitudes of those diagnosed with the condition, the 
experiences of caregivers and the impact these differing experiences have on 
perceptions of the condition and the conceptualisations of genetic risk. Such an 
exploration, as highlighted by Etchegary et al. (2008), may help counsellors to 
identify those individuals most likely to experience distress in prenatal or carrier 
testing counselling processes and who might benefit from additional support (p.123). 
This research, however, also points to some of the difficulties associated with making 
this form of knowledge available to prospective parents particularly for variable 
conditions or where multiple conditions are being screened for.  including its potential 
to constrain reproductive decisions. Kaplan (1999) has argued that altruism is often 
used as a justification for selective termination decisions following the diagnosis of a 
disability or impairment. For individuals who participated in this study whose 
experiences with SMA were largely positive, the notion that prenatal testing and 
selective termination prevents future suffering could not be reconciled with their 
everyday experiences of life with SMA. Similarly, the issue of who is entitled to lay 
claim to experiential knowledge, even within families, could be sight of contestation 
and tension. For would-be parents then, experiential knowledge could at once provide 
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insight, but also, paradoxically be experienced as oppressive, increasing uncertainties 
around reproduction and rendering them trapped between competing concerns and 
demands. This research therefore points to some of the difficulties, as well as the 
benefits, associated with the advancement of experiential knowledge as a resource in 
reproductive decision making, particularly as a way to ‘give voice’ (Bricher, 1999) to 
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Tables 1 and 2 




Table 1: The Diagnoses of Spinal Muscular Atrophy within the Sample 
Diagnosis Number of 
Participants with 




     Female        Male           
Spinal Muscular Atrophy Type I 12 11 1 
Spinal Muscular Atrophy Type II 32 25 7 
Spinal Muscular Atrophy Type III 11 10 1 
Spinal Muscular Atrophy with Respiratory Distress* 3 2 1 
Spinal Bulbar Muscular Atrophy* 2 1 1 
Autosomal Dominant Spinal Muscular Atrophy* 1 0 1 
Total 61 49 12 
(* Variant Form of Spinal Muscular Atrophy) 
 
 
Table 2: The Participants’ Relationship to the Person Diagnosed with Spinal Muscular Atrophy 
Nature of Experience with SMA Participant 
Numbers 
Gender 
Female                 Male          
Diagnosed with SMA Themselves 25 21 4 
Sibling of person with SMA, without SMA            
themselves 
7 4 3 
Parent of person diagnosed with SMA  24 21 3 
Grandparent of person diagnosed with SMA 1 1 0 
Son or daughter of person diagnosed with SMA 2 1 1 
Partner or spouse of person diagnosed with SMA 2 1 1 
Total 61 49 12 
 
 
 
 
